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Many studies conclude there is a strong relationship between moral reasoning and illegal 
behaviour amongst young offenders.  However, there has been no research examining 
this relationship amongst people with intellectual disabilities.  There is some empirical 
evidence to suggest that the relationship between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour 
may be curvilinear, such that lower moral reasoning and higher moral reasoning relates to 
lower rates of illegal behaviour and inappropriate conduct.  Given this, and evidence that 
people with intellectual disabilities are reasoning at a lower moral stage than their same-
age peers, it is proposed that some people with intellectual disabilities may actually be 
less likely to engage in illegal behaviour because they are reasoning at an earlier moral 
stageZKLOHWKRVHZLWKµERUGHUOLQH¶LQWHOOLJHQFHZRXOGEHmore likely to engage in illegal 
behaviour.   This suggests that the relationship between moral reasoning and illegal 
behaviour is moderated by intelligence, and this has implications for the design of 
intervention programmes for people with intellectual disabilities, but further research is 
needed.   
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Moral Reasoning Theory and Illegal Behaviour by Adults with Intellectual Disabilities 
 
Meta-analytic studies have demonstrated a strong relationship between moral reasoning 
and illegal behaviour, including both crimes and antisocial behaviour amongst young 
offenders (Blasi, 1HOVRQ6PLWK	'RGG6WDPV%UXJPDQ'HNRYLü	YDQ
Rosmalen, 2006).The most recent study reported that moral reasoning is lower amongst 
µdelinquenW¶ adolescents than µnon-delinquents¶ZLWKDODUJHHIIHFWVL]HRI  d=0.76 
(Stams, et al., 2006).  However, these meta-analytic studies do not include populations of 
people with intellectual disabilities (ID).  As a consequence little is known about the 
relationship between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour for this group.   
 
In this paper, we present a brief summary of moral reasoning theory, followed by a 
discussion of the proposed relationships between moral reasoning, intelligence and illegal 
behaviour. We then review the relevant literature involving people with ID, and draw 
attention to its theoretical and empirical limitations. We conclude that, as far as is known, 
no studies have examined the potential relationship between moral reasoning and illegal 
behaviour in this population. In an attempt to address this gap, we propose that the 
relationship between intelligence and such behaviour is moderated by moral reasoning. 
The implication is that at least some people with ID may actually be less likely to engage 
in illegal behaviour than their counterparts in the general population.  However, we 
recognise that, given the unsatisfactory nature of the literature, that the evidence base in 
support of our proposal is weak.   
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Moral Reasoning Theory 
Piaget (1932) is credited with constructing the first psychological theory of moral 
development.  He argued that moral development occurs in parallel with and is dependent 
upon logical reasoning; moral development cannot occur without associated 
developmental progression within the logical reasoning domain.  Given the link between 
cognitive ability and moral reasoning, the implications for people with ID are obvious.    
 
However, one of the difficulties with Piagetian theory is that it does not consider 
development beyond childhood.   This difficulty was addressed by Kohlberg (1969, 
1974) who proposed a stage theory of moral development that extended beyond 
childhood and into adolescence and adulthood. Kohlbergian moral reasoning theory 
originally comprised six stages, spread across three levels (Table 1), and forming a 
hierarchical stage model where more complex levels of moral reasoning required 
successful progression through earlier stages in a more or less linear fashion.  The 
progression in moral reasoning was accompanied by a parallel developmental progression 
in logical reasoning, or cognitive abilities, similar to that proposed by Piaget (1932).   
 
Over the years, there have been a wide range of criticisms of Kohlbergian moral stage 
theory on the grounds of cultural bias (Simpson, 1974), Western liberalism (Schweder, 
1982; Sullivan, 1977), masculinist conceptualisations of morality (Gilligan, 1982), and 
the lack of attention paid to the important role of emotion (Sullivan, 1977).  Moreover, 
little evidence has been found for the existence of higher order levels of moral reasoning 
within various populations, while stage reversal and regression have also been reported 
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(Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977).  However, Kohlberg and his colleagues attempted to 
address these criticisms by revising the scoring methods of their data collection 
instruments, revising theory and reanalysing their data (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 
1983, 1984).   
 
 
INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Nevertheless, many of the criticisms remained salient, and Gibbs (1979) argued for the 
separation of post-conventional reasoning completely from moral reasoning theory on the 
grounds that such mature levels of moral reasoning were ³existential´. Drawing on 
evidence that post-conventional moral reasoning is achieved infrequently across cultures, 
Gibbs and his colleagues (1979; Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992) revised Kohlbergian 
moral theory into a sociomoral stage theory regarding the reasons or justifications people 
give for their behaviour (Table 2), and their revisions have recently been shown to have 
cross cultural validity (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey, 2007).  This sociomoral 
reasoning theory, and the associated instruments for measuring moral stage, have 
subsequently been used widely to examine the relationship between illegal behaviour and 
moral reasoning, and the theory has been developed further. Gibbs (2003) revisited his 
theoretical perspective and placed moral reasoning within the context of traditional 
information processing theory, drawing parallels between moral stages and schema.  At 
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the same time, he recognised the importance of emotional states such as empathy, as 
considered by Hoffman (2000).   
 
 
INSERT TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Moral Reasoning, Illegal Behaviour and Intelligence 
According to Gibbs (2003), D³developmental delay LQPRUDOMXGJHPHQW´ (p. 135) 
coupled with distorted cognitions and social skill deficits are common among the 
perpetrators of illegal behaviours, and suggested WKDW³«antisocial behaviour stems in 
SDUWIURPPRUDOSHUFHSWLRQEDVHGRQGHYHORSPHQWDOO\GHOD\HGPRUDOLW\´S He 
argued that illegal behaviour is driven by cognitive distortions that are generated by the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIVFKHPDUHIOHFWLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VPRUDOVWDJH This account has been 
elaborated by Palmer (2003a; 2003b), who embedded moral reasoning within the context 
of a developmental theory that recognises the influences of peers and parents, information 
processing, and social and environmental factors.  Like Gibbs (2003),  Palmer (2003a, 
2003b) proposed that immature moral reasoning leads to the generation of cognitive 
distortions, used by an individual to support their illegal behaviour. She thus provided a 
theoretical link as to why moral reasoning theory may be associated with behaviour that 
is against the law.  
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$OWKRXJK*LEEVVWDWHGWKDW³PRUDOGHYHORSPHQWDOGHOD\UHfers chiefly to the 
SHUVLVWHQFHRILPPDWXUHPRUDOLW\LQWRDGROHVFHQFHDQGDGXOWKRRG´Sone of the 
difficulties within this area is that the majority of studies have been conducted using 
populations of adolescents.  The studies that have used adult participants have reported 
mixed findings.   Watt, Frausin, Dixon & Nimmo (2000) examined the moral reasoning 
of adult male and female convicted offenders, and female non-offenders using 
Kohlbergian moral stories; there were no differences between the groups.  Along the 
same lines, Griffore and Samuels (1978) reported no difference on a measure of moral 
reasoning  between the performance of male convicted offenders within a maximum 
security prison and normative data drawn from the general population. In contrast,  
Thornton and Reid (1982) reported that while adult convicted offenders tended to engage 
in moral reasoning at Stage 2, some emergence of Stage 3 reasoning could be found 
among those whose crimes had a higher risk of detection.  This, it was argued, suggested 
a tendency to think about the needs of others and society, rather than simply the possible 
consequences for the self, indicating greater maturity.  In another study, Stevenson, Hall 
and Innes (2003) reported that the moral reasoning of adult convicted offenders was  
significantly lower than that of non-offenders, but the offenders were still reasoning at 
Stage 3.  Finally, in a study examining the moral reasoning of adult patients within a high 
secure hospital in the United Kingdom (O'Kane, Fawcett, & Blackburn, 1996), it was  
reported that the positive relationship between moral reasoning and psychopathy 
evaporated when IQ was controlled, but the relationship between moral reasoning and 
antisocial aggression remained.    
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While the empirical evidence from adults is mixed, theories of moral development rest 
upon the premise that developmental progression is dependent upon, and occurs in 
parallel with, the development of cognitive ability (Gibbs, 1979; Kohlberg, 1958, 1969; 
Piaget, 1932).  Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that cognitive development 
mediates moral reasoning (Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey, 1974), and studies using large 
samples of children from the general population have demonstrated a significant positive 
relationship between intelligence and moral reasoning development (Hoffman, 1977; 
Johnson, 1962).   Theoretically, people with a developmental delay, such as those with an 
ID, are therefore more likely to engage in moral reasoning at earlier developmental 
levels.  
 
Such an argument has significant theoretical implications for our understanding of the 
propensity of people with ID to engage in illegal behaviour. There is a literature linking 
intelligence with offending behaviour (Farrington, 1996; Hirschi & Hindelang, 1977; 
Moffitt, 1993; Moffitt, Gabrielli, & Mednick, 1981), and recent large aggregate studies 
have suggested a relationship between intelligence and some types of offending, such as 
sexual offending (Cantor, Blanchard, Robichaud, & Christensen, 2005).  However, many 
of these studies have not included people who have met the diagnostic criteria for an 
intellectual disability (i.e. a Full Scale IQ of less than 70, coupled with significant deficits 
in adaptive behaviour, with childhood onset).   Moreover, the relationships between 
illegal behaviour, moral reasoning and ID have not been addressed.  If it were assumed 
that the relationships between these variables were generally linear, it would be expected 
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that lower intelligence would be associated with both lower moral reasoning and higher 
rates of illegal behaviour (Figure 1a).   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
However, there is some evidence within the literature suggesting that the relationship 
between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour may not be linear, but instead takes the 
form of an inverted U-curve (Figure 1b).  Theoretically, the curvilinear relationship can 
be explained by examining the stages of moral reasoning theory: reasoning at Stage 1 is 
associated with obeying rules, leading to low levels of illegal behaviour.  Stage 2, which 
is associated with an egocentric view characterised by meeting WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶Vown 
needs, leads to an increase in disruptive behaviour. At Stage 3, which is associated with 
the development of moral reasoning based on maintaining relationships and a shift away 
from an egocentricism, illegal behaviour decreases.   There is some empirical support for 
this relationship. As Gibbs (2003) notes, many studies have demonstrated that 
µdelinquent¶ adolescents tend to make more use of Stage 2 moral reasoning with regards 
to concepts such as justice and the law (Blasi, 1980; Campagna & Harter, 1975; Chandler 
& Moran, 1990; Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs, 1983; Gregg, Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994; 
Nelson, et al., 1990; Trevethan & Walker, 1989). In contrast,  µnon-delinquent¶ 
adolescents tend to give Stage 3 reasons for obeying the law (Gibbs, 2003). Supportive 
findings have also been obtained in children (Richards et al., 1992).  Assuming a similar 
set of relationships exists amongst people with ID, then those engaging in moral 
reasoning at Stage 2, who would be more likely to be of µERUGHUOLQH¶intelligence would 
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be at greatest risk of behaving illegally. At both lower and higher levels of moral 
reasoning and intelligence, illegal behaviour would decrease (see Figure 1b).    
 
Intellectual Disabilities, Moral Reasoning Theory, and Behaviour 
Are people with ID reasoning at a lower moral stage as the theory proposes?  It is 
difficult to draw conclusions about this issue given the heterogeneity of the population 
and the state of the literature.  The current literature regarding the moral development of 
people with intellectual disabilities is problematic because it predates many of the 
theoretical developments that have occurred within this area.  Moreover, while a few 
studies have included adults (e.g. Blakey, 1973), the majority of studies have included 
only child or adolescent participants. Often, the comparison groups are also 
unsatisfactory, because participants with ID are matched to (usually much younger) 
typically developing children, using some index of intellectual functioning such as 
µPHQWDODJH¶ 
 
In addition, early studies make use of unstandardised measures of moral reasoning. 
Measurement is an important issue within the area of moral reasoning. There are two 
categories of assessment measures: 1) recognition instruments, and 2) production 
instruments.   Recognition instruments provide a set of moral justifications, traditionally 
following the reading of a moral dilemma, after which respondents are asked to choose 
which best matches their own reasoning.  In contrast, production instruments require 
respondents to verbalise their own moral reasoning in response to questions aimed to 
elicit these judgements. Recognition instruments are more likely to be affected by 
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socially desirable responding, while  production instruments have been found to 
discriminate more reliably between offenders and non-offenders (Blasi, 1980; Gavaghan, 
et al., 1983).   No attention has been paid within the literature as to which method of 
measuring moral reasoning is most appropriate to use with people with ID and further 
studies are required to investigate this issue.  
 
Notwithstanding the major theoretical and empirical limitations, the literature indicates 
overwhelmingly that the  moral development of people with ID  lags behind that of age-
matched peers without ID (Bender, 1980; Blakey, 1973; Foye & Simeonsson, 1979; 
Gargiulo, 1984; Jackson & Haines, 1982; Kahn, 1976, 1983; Lind & Smith, 1984; Taylor 
& Achenbach, 1975). Most often, the moral reasoning of participants with ID matches 
that of typically developing younger participants, indicating a relationship with 
intellectual functioning.  Mahaney and Stephens (1974) reported that children and 
adolescents with ID make progress through the developmental stages of moral reasoning, 
but this progress may not be as marked or as consistent as that which occurs amongst 
their peers without ID.  Overall, the studies suggest that adults with ID are reasoning at a 
developmentally earlier moral stage when compared to their peers (Bender, 1980; Blakey, 
1973; Foye & Simeonsson, 1979; Gargiulo, 1984; Jackson & Haines, 1982; Kahn, 1976, 
1983; Lind & Smith, 1984; Taylor & Achenbach, 1975).  
 
At present, little is known about the moral reasoning stage at which people with ID are 
functioning. Two studies are important and shed some light on this issue. The first, by 
Sigman, Ungerer and Russell (1983), is the only one to have made use of a standardised 
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procedure VWRULHVIURP.ROKEHUJ¶V6WDQGDUG6FRULQJ0DQXDOIRUPHDVXULQJPRUDO
reasoning amongst a small group (N=20) of adolescent ZLWKDµERUGHUOLQH¶LQWHOOHFWXDO
disability, although this measure of moral reasoning is relatively old.  All of the 
participants were inpatients with behavioural difficulties on a ward within a hospital. 
They reported that most of their sample scored at the preconventional level (Stages 1 and 
2) with scores being spread across Stages 1 to 3.  The second study, by Taylor & 
Achenbach (1975), compared children with and without ID matched according to 
ZKHWKHUWKH\KDGµORZPRGHUDWHRUKLJK¶PHQWDODJH  Hence, older children with ID 
were compared to younger children without ID.  Children of lower µPHQWDODJH¶ were 
reasoning at Stage 1, with a few reasoning at moral Stage 2.  None of the participants of 
lower or moderate µPHQWDODJH¶ were reasoning at Stage 3.  These findings are consistent 
with the theoretical relationship between cognitive ability and moral reasoning 
development.  
 
Is there a relationship between moral reasoning and behaviour amongst people with ID?  
There are only three known studies have considered this possibility.  The largest study, 
albeit focusing on children and adolescents, is that of Moore & Stephens (1974). They 
examined the development of µPRUDOFRQGXFW¶ longitudinally over several years among 
150 children and adolescents allocated to groups of equal size according to whether or 
not they had an ID.  A series of structured situations was devised in which each 
participant¶VEHKDYLRXUZDVREVHUYHGin an atWHPSWWRDVVHVVµPRUDOFRQGXFW¶.  Situations 
were classed into those that aimed to assess self-control, honesty, stealing, mishaps, 
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cheating and persistence.  In a second study, the  moral reasoning of the same participants 
was assessed and reported  (Mahaney & Stephens, 1974).    
 
The initial cross-sectional data demonstrated a developmental increase in µmoral conduct¶ 
across age for both groups. As expected, the scores of participants with ID were poorer  
than for those without ID, but the difference disappeared when participants were matched 
according to µPHQWDODJH¶.  Interestingly, the longitudinal data indicated that, among the 
adolescents aged 12-16 years, there was deterioration over time in their µPRUDOFRQGXFW¶, 
and this did not occur among their peers without an ID.   While no reference to moral 
stage was made within this study, the deterioration in behaviour would be predicted by 
the proposed curvilinear relationship between moral reasoning and behaviour shown in 
Figure 1 (b).  
 
In a different study, Jackson & Haines (1982) examined the relationship between moral 
reasoning and behaviour amongst children with ID.  They matched children with ID 
according to µPHQWDODJH¶ to children without ID.  They presented the Jackson 
Hypothetical Temptation to Steal Test, where participants are read a story about being 
tempted to steal and asked to say what they think they would do in that situation.  This 
VHULHVRIVWRULHVLQFRUSRUDWHGD³VKRXOG´VWDWHPHQWWRHOLFLWIURPSDUWLFLSDQWs what they 
thought they µshould actually do¶ in each situation.   Girls without ID reported 
significantly more frequently than girls with ID that they would resist stealing, but there 
was no difference between the two groups of boys.    The researchers reported no 
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difference between children with and without ID with respect to their report of what they 
³VKRXOGGR´DQGVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKLVUHIOHFWHGVLPLODUOHYHOVRImoral reasoning.  
 
Finally, as previously mentioned, Sigman, Ungerer & Russell (1983) also examined the 
relationship between moral reasoning and behaviour in a small sample of adolescent in- 
patients.  The mean Full Scale IQ of the sample was 70.2 suggesting that the sample had 
Dµborderline¶ ID overall6WRULHVIURP.RKOEHUJ¶V6WDQGDUG6FRULQJ0DQXDO(Sigman, et 
al., 1983) were used to measure moral reasoning, and behaviour was measured using the 
&RQQHUV¶5DWLQJ6FDOH(Conners, 1969).  The authors did not find any relationship 
between moral reasoning and µPHQWDODJH¶ or IQ.   However, there was a significant 
relationship between moral reasoning and behavioural difficulties.   
 
Intellectual Disabilities, Moral Reasoning, and Offending  
There are no known studies that have investigated the relationship between moral 
reasoning, ID, and offending, and it has been recognised that empirical studies are needed 
(Lindsay, Hastings, Griffiths, & Hayes, 2007).  However, there are numerous  
methodological difficulties with the literature that has attempted to examine offending by 
people with ID (for reviews see, Holland, Clare, & Mukhopadhyay, 2002; Murphy & 
Mason, 2007). These include the problems, well-known to criminologists (Bottomley, 
1981), of using µofficial¶ data  collected by the criminal justice system to estimate the 
prevalence of criminal behaviour.  This is problematic because a lot of illegal behaviour 
goes undetected and unreported. The proportion of illegal behaviour that is investigated, 
prosecuted, and results in a criminal conviction, meaning that the perpetrator is an 
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µRIIHQGHU¶LVHYHQPRUHOLPLWHG In addition, the definition and assessment of an 
intellectual disability remains contentious (see Holland et al., 2002; Murphy & Mason, 
2007), with many studies focussing on WKHLQWHOOLJHQFHµDUP¶RIWKHFULWHULDDORQH 
 
Nevertheless, given the established relationship between intelligence and illegal 
behaviour (Cantor, et al., 2005; Farrington, 1996; Hirschi & Hindelang, 1977; Moffitt, 
1993; Moffitt, et al., 1981), the suggestion that people with ID are over-represented 
among those who engage in offending merits attention.  There are some supportive data.  
For example, Hayes (1993; 1996) reported that people with ID are grossly over-
represented among defendants appearing in Australian courts, while studies of a large 
European birth cohort  have indicated that men and women with ID are more likely to 
have been convicted of an offence (Hodgins, 1992; Hodgins, Mednick, Brennan, 
Schulsinger, & Engberg, 1996). 
 
Similarly, studies of  populations of remanded or convicted prisoners in the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere indicate a prevalence rate from 0 to 28% (Birmingham, Mason, 
& Grubin, 1996; Brooke, Taylor, Gunn, & Maden, 1996; Coid, 1988; Gunn, Maden, & 
Swinton, 1991; MacEachron, 1979; Mulrooney, Murphy, Harrold, & Carey, 2004; 
Murphy, Harnett, & Holland, 1995; Singleton, Meltzer, Gatward, Coid, & Deasy, 1997). 
Similarly, in a recent study, (Hayes, Shackell, Mottram, & Lancaster, 2007) assessed a 
random sample of 140 convicted prisoners using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-
III and a measure of adaptive behaviour.  It was found that 7.1% of the sample obtained a 
Full Scale IQ score below 70. At the same time, studies suggest that 2 - 10% of men and 
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women who are known to  ID services have had contact with the police as possible 
perpetrators (McBrien, Hodgetts, & Gregory, 2003; McNulty, Kissi-Deborah, & 
Newsom-Davies, 1995; Messinger & Apfelberg, 1961)  
 
However, from the limited information available, the majority of individuals in contact 
with the criminal justice system are people whose intellectual abilities lie within the 
µERUGHUOLQH¶WRµORZDYHUDJH¶range, and do not meet all the criteria for ID.  For example, 
in their prison study, Hayes et al. (2007) found that only four (2.8%) participants fulfilled 
diagnostic criteria for an ID, with both a Full Scale IQ <70 and difficulties with adaptive 
functioning.  In contrast, 50% of their prisoners obtained IQ scores in the range 70-89, 
and 42.2 % had scores of 90 or more. Such results are consistent with those of the police 
station studies. Gudjonsson and his colleagues (Gudjonsson et al., 1993) found that 42% 
of their participants obtained FXOO6FDOH,4VFRUHVZLWKLQWKHµERUGHUOLQH¶ range (see also 
Murphy and Mason, 2007, for further discussion).    In fact, a recent systematic review of 
studies investigating the prevalence of ID amongst prisoners found that actually only 
between 0.5 and 1.5% of prisoners have an ID (Fazel, Xenitidis, & Powell, 2008) 
although they caution that their findings are likely to have been affected by 
methodological variations in the studies included within the review.   
 
Similarly, McCord and McCord (1959), in a study examining the conviction rates of 
adolescent boys, reported that boys with an IQ ranging from 81-90 had a 44% conviction 
rate, while boys with an IQ above 110, and boys with an IQ of less than 80 had a much 
lower conviction rate of 26% and 35% respectively.   Also, Gray, Fitzgerald, Taylor, 
Moral Reasoning and Intellectual Disabilities 17 
MacCulloch & Snowden (2007) reported that people with ID discharged from a secure 
hospital re-offended at a significantly lower rate for violent and general offences in 
comparison to people without ID, suggesting that people with ID have a pattern of 
offending that is different from people without ID.   
 
While all of these studies must be treated with caution, the findings cast doubt on the 
view that the relationship between intelligence and illegal behaviour is always linear, and 
that people with ID are over-represented amongst populations of those engaging in illegal 
behaviour.  Instead, these studies suggest that the pattern and rate of offending by people 
with an actual ID may be lowerDQGWKRVHZLWKµERUGHUOLQH¶,'DSSHDUPRUHOLNHO\WREH
overrepresented amongst populations of those who have engaged in illegal behaviour.  
Although this evidence does not allow us to conclude that the relationship between moral 
reasoning and offending is curvilinear, and is moderated by intelligence, it does allow us 
to suggest that the relationships between these variables may not actually be linear.  
 
Discussion  
Drawing on previous findings involving other groups, we propose that intelligence 
moderates the relationship between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour and this has 
implications for understanding illegal behaviour among those with ID.  The implications 
are that people with ID may be less likely, or at least as likely as people without ID to 
engage in illegal behaviourZKLOHWKRVHZLWKµERUGHUOLQH¶,'VKRXOGEHPRUHOLNHO\WR
engage in illegal behaviour.  However, the current evidence base in limited and further 
research is needed.    
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In terms of future research, as a first step, attention needs to be paid to the development 
and design of effective tools for measuring moral reasoning amongst people with ID.  
The literature is outdated and flawed by a range of theoretical and methodological 
limitations (Abel, 1941; Blakey, 1973; Boehm, 1967; Inhelder, 1966; Taylor & 
Achenbach, 1975) that need to be addressed. One of the key issues relates to the 
assessment of moral development.  Recognition instruments may have greater utility for  
people with ID, who may have difficulties with verbal language.  One problem is that 
some existing recognition instruments do not measure the earlier stages of moral 
reasoning (Rest, 1979; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999) and may therefore be 
VXEMHFWWRµIORRU¶HIIHFWV  Therefore, some development work is needed with regard to 
the measurement of moral reasoning amongst people with ID. 
  
As a second step, empirical investigations of the relationships between moral reasoning, 
ID and illegal behaviour are needed. If the proposed relationships are found, this may 
lead to intervention studies.  Several studies have demonstrated that self-serving 
cognitive distortions exist amongst sex offenders with ID (Broxholme & Lindsay, 2003; 
Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Lindsay & Michie, 2004; Lindsay, Whitefield, & Carson, 
2007), which, based on moral reasoning theory, would relate to egocentric cognitive 
biases stemming from maladaptive moral schema.   Most cognitive-behaviour treatment 
programmes regarding illegal behaviour, whether or not they involve people with an ID, 
focus upon correcting self-serving cognitive biases, but these interventions may not be 
nested within a moral reasoning framework.  The use of such a framework may enable 
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these distortions to be targeted more effectively, improving outcome by promoting 
perspective-taking, and, in turn, enhancing moral reasoning.  Inadvertently, this provides 
a theoretical rationale for group-based interventions within forensic settings, since they 
provide more opportunities for perspective-taking than individual treatment.  
 
Group-based interventions for anti-social young people that focus solely on enhancing 
moral reasoning appear to be successful, but they do not have the desired impact on 
conduct (Arbuthnot & Gordon, 1986; Gibbs, Arnold, Alhborn, & Cheesman, 1984; 
Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995; Niles, 1986). Theoretically, this may be because moral 
reasoning can be construed as distal schema within the context of a social situation, while 
cognitive distortions and social skills are proximal.  Gibbs and his colleagues (Gibbs, 
2003; Gibbs, et al., 1995) argue that proximal as well as distal interventions are required, 
and that when these are used, they are successful (Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993).   
 
Unfortunately, at present, very little can be said about the appropriateness of such 
interventions for people with ID. This is of concern because when these individuals  
have, or are suspected to have, engaged in illegal behaviours, the consequences can be 
very serious. They may be dealt with µinformally¶WKURXJKXQSODQQHGPRYHVRIWHQWR
distant placements, away from their local areas, and with no certainty that they will 
receive appropriate treatment and support (Department of Health, 2007).  For those who 
come to the attention of the criminal justice system, the outcomes may be no better. The 
plight of those in prison is particularly problematic because of overcrowding, bullying 
DQGµFKXUQ¶ZKHUH convicted prisoners are moved about the system unpredictably 
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(Louckes and Talbot, 2007).   Consequently, further research regarding effective 
treatments for people with ID who are engaged in illegal behaviour is urgently needed.  
 
Moral Reasoning and Intellectual Disabilities 21 
 
Abel, T. (1941). Moral judgments among subnormals. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 36, 378-392. 
Arbuthnot, J. & Gordon, D. A. (1986). Behavioural and cognitive effects of moral 
reasoning development intervention for high-risk behavior-disordered 
adolescents. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 85, 1275-1301. 
Bender, N. N. (1980). Intent and outcome in the moral judgement of mentally retarded 
and nonretarded children. Mental Retardation, 39-40. 
Birmingham, L., Mason, D., & Grubin, D. (1996). Prevalence of mental disorder in 
remand prisoners: consecutive case study. British Medical Journal, 313, 1521-
1524. 
Blakey, R. (1973). Moral judgements in subnormal adults and normal children. British 
Journal of Mental Subnormality, 19, 85-90. 
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review of the 
literature Psychological Bulletin, 88, 1-45. 
Boehm, L. D. (1967). Conscience development in mentally retarded adolescents. The 
Journal of Special Education, 2, 93-103. 
Bottomley, A. (1981). Criminology in Focus.  Past Trends and Future Prospects. 
Oxford: Martin Robinson. 
Brooke, D., Taylor, C., Gunn, J., & Maden, A. (1996). Point prevalence of mental 
disorder in unconvicted male prisoners in England and Wales. British Medical 
Journal, 313, 1524-1526. 
Broxholme, S. L. & Lindsay, W. R. (2003). Development and preliminary evaluation of a 
questionnaire on cognitions related to sex offending for use with individuals who 
have mild intellectual disabilities. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 47, 
472-482. 
Campagna, A. F. & Harter, S. (1975). Moral judgment in sociopathic and normal 
children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 199-205. 
Cantor, J. M., Blanchard, R., Robichaud, L. K., & Christensen, B. K. (2005). Quantitative 
Reanalysis of Aggregate Data on IQ in Sexual Offenders. Psychological Bulletin, 
131, 555-568. 
Chandler, M. & Moran, T. (1990). Psychotherapy and moral development: A 
comparative study of deliquent and nondeliquent youth. Development and 
Psychopathology, 2, 227-246. 
Coid, J. (1988). Mentally abnormal prisoners on remand- rejected or accepted by the 
NHS? British Medical Journal, 296, 1779-1782. 
Conners, C. K. (1969). A teacher ratings scale for use in drug studies with children. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 126, 884-888. 
DoH (2007). Services for People with Learning Disabilities and Challenging Behaviour 
or Mental Health Needs (Revised Edition). London: The Stationery Office. 
Farrington, D. P. (1996). Understanding and Preventing Youth Crime. York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. 
Fazel, S., Xenitidis, K., & Powell, J. (2008). The prevalence of intellectual disabilities 
among 12000 prisoners - systematic review. International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry, 31, 369-373. 
Moral Reasoning and Intellectual Disabilities 22 
Foye, H. & Simeonsson, R., J. (1979). Quantitative and qualitative analyses of moral 
reasoning in children, adolescents, and adults of similar mental age. Journal of 
Pediatric Psychology, 4, 197-209. 
Gargiulo, R. M. (1984). Cognitive style and moral judgement in mentally handicapped 
and non-handicapped children of equal mental age. British Journal of 
Developmental Psychology, 2, 83-89. 
Gavaghan, M. P., Arnold, K. D., & Gibbs, J. C. (1983). Moral judgment in delinquents 
and nondelinquents - recognition versus production measures. Journal of 
Psychology, 114, 267-274. 
Gibbs, J. C. (1979). Kohlberg's moral stage theory. A Piagetian revision. Human 
Development, 22, 89-112. 
Gibbs, J. C. (2003). Moral Development and Reality - Beyond the Theories of Kohlberg 
and Hoffman. London: Sage Publications Ltd  
Gibbs, J. C., Arnold, K. D., Alhborn, H. H., & Cheesman, F. L. (1984). Facilitation of 
sociomoral reasoning in delinquents. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 52, 37-45. 
Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., & Fuller, D. (1992). Moral Maturity: Measuing the 
Development of Sociomoral Reflection. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Gibbs, J. C., Basinger, K. S., Grime, R. L., & Snarey, J. R. (2007). Moral judgement 
development across cultures: revisiting Kohlberg's universality claims. 
Development Review, 27, 443-500. 
Gibbs, J. C., Potter, G., & Goldstein, A. P. (1995). The EQUIP Programme: Teaching 
Youth to Think and Act Responsibly Through a Peer-Helping Approach. 
Champaign, IL: Research Press. 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's 
Development. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Gray, N. S., Fitzgerald, S., Taylor, J., MacCulloch, M. J., & Snowden, R. J. (2007). 
Predicting future reconviction rates in offenders with intellectual disabilities: The 
predictive efficacy of VRAG, PCL-SV, and the HCR-20. Psychological 
Assessment, 19, 474-479. 
Gregg, V., Gibbs, J., C., & Basinger, K., S. (1994). Patterns of developmental delay in 
moral judgement by male and female delinquents. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 40, 
538-553. 
Griffore, R. J. & Samuels, D. D. (1978). Moral judgement of residents of a maximum 
security correctional facility. Journal of Psychology, 100, 3-7. 
Gunn, J., Maden, A., & Swinton, M. (1991). Treatment needs of prisoners with 
psychiatric disorders. British Medical Journal, 303, 339-341. 
Hayes, S. (1993). People with an Intellectual Disability and the Criminal Justice System: 
Appearances Before the Local Courts. Research Report No. 4. Sydney: New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission. 
Hayes, S. (1996). People with an Intellectual Disability and the Criminal Justice System: 
Two Rural Courts. Research Report No.5. Sydney: New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission. 
Hayes, S., Shackell, P., Mottram, P., & Lancaster, R. (2007). The prevalence of 
intellectual disability in a major UK prison. British Journal of Learning 
Disabilities, 35, 162-167. 
Moral Reasoning and Intellectual Disabilities 23 
Hirschi, T. & Hindelang, M. J. (1977). Intelligence and delinquency: A revisionist 
review. American Sociological Review, 42, 571-587. 
Hodgins, S. (1992). Mental disorder, intellectual deficiency, and crime: evidence from a 
birth cohort Archives of General Psychiatry, 49, 476-483. 
Hodgins, S., Mednick, S. A., Brennan, P. A., Schulsinger, F., & Engberg, M. (1996). 
Mental disorder and crime: evidence from a Danish birth cohort. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 53, 489-496. 
Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and 
Justice Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoffman, S. (1977). Intelligence and the Development of Moral Judgement in Children. 
The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 130, 27-34. 
Holland, T., Clare, I. C. H., & Mukhopadhyay, T. (2002). Prevalence of 'criminal 
offending' by men and women with intellectual disability and the characteristics 
of 'offenders': implications for research and service development. Journal of 
Intellectual Disability Research, 46(Supp 1), 6-20. 
Inhelder, B. (1966). Cognitive-developmental contributions to the diagnosis of some 
phenomena of mental deficiency. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 12, 299-319. 
Jackson, M. S. & Haines, A. T. (1982). A comparative study of the responses of young 
children and older retarded children in hypothetical temptation to steal situations. 
Australia & New Zealand Journal of Developmental Disabilities, 8, 85-91. 
Johnson, R. C. (1962). A study of children's moral judgements. Child Development, 33, 
327-354. 
Kahn, J. V. (1976). Moral and cognitive development of moderately retarded, mildly 
retarded, and nonretarded individuals. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 
81, 209-214. 
Kahn, J. V. (1983). Moral reasoning of Piagetian-matched retarded and nonretarded-
children and adolescents. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 143, 69-77. 
Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-development approach to 
socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of Socialization Theory and 
Research (pp. 347-480). Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Kohlberg, L., Levine, C., & Hewer, A. (1983). Moral stages: A current formulation and a 
response to critics. In J. A. Meacham (Ed.), Contributions to Human Development 
(Vol. 10). London: Karger. 
Kohlberg, L., Levine, C., & Hewer, A. (1984). Synopses and detailed replies to critics 
Essays on Moral Development: The Psychology of Moral Development: The 
Nature and Validity of Moral Stages (Vol. II, pp. 320-386). San Francisco: Harper 
& Row. 
Langdon, P. E. & Talbot, T. J. (2006). Locus of control and sex offenders with an 
intellectual disability. International Journal of Offender Therapy and 
Comparative Criminology, 50, 391-401. 
Leeman, L. W., Gibbs, J. C., & Fuller, D. (1993). Evaluation of a multicompenent group 
treatment programme for juvenile delinquents. Aggressive Behavior, 19, 281-292. 
Lind, P. & Smith, E., J. (1984). Moral reasoning and social functioning among educable 
mentally handicapped children. Australia & New Zealand Journal of 
Developmental Disabilities, 10, 209-215. 
Moral Reasoning and Intellectual Disabilities 24 
Lindsay, W. R., Hastings, R. P., Griffiths, D. M., & Hayes, S. C. (2007). Trends and 
challenges in forensic research on offenders with intellectual disability. Journal of 
Intellectual and Developmental Disability, 32, 55-61. 
Lindsay, W. R. & Michie, A. M. (2004). Two studies using the questionnaire on attitudes 
consistent with sexual offending (QACSO) to discriminate between categories of 
sex offenders. Journal of Intellectual Disability Research, 48, 464-464. 
Lindsay, W. R., Whitefield, E., & Carson, D. (2007). An assessment for attitudes 
consistent with sexual offending for use with offenders with intellectual 
disabilities. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 12, 55-68. 
MacEachron, A. E. (1979). Mentally retarded offenders: prevalence and characteristics. 
American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 84, 165-176. 
Mahaney, E. J. J. & Stephens, B. (1974). Two-year gains in moral judgement by retarded 
and nonretarded persons. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 79, 134-141. 
McBrien, J., Hodgetts, A., & Gregory, J. (2003). Offending and risky behaviour in 
community services for people with intellectual disabilities in one local authority. 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 14, 280-297. 
McCord, W. & McCord, J. (1959). Origins of Crime: A New Evaluation of the 
Cambridge Somerville Youth Study. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
McNulty, C., Kissi-Deborah, R., & Newsom-Davies, I. (1995). Police involvement with 
clients having intellectual disabilities: a pilot study in south London. Mental 
Handicap Research, 8, 129-136. 
Messinger, E. & Apfelberg, B. (1961). A quarter of a century of court psychiatry. Crime 
and Delinquency, 7, 343-362. 
Moffitt, T. E. (1993). The neuropsychology of conduct disorder. Development and 
Psychopathology, 5, 135-151. 
Moffitt, T. E., Gabrielli, W. F., & Mednick, S. A. (1981). Socioeconomic status, IQ, and 
delinquency. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 90, 152-156. 
Mulrooney, M., Murphy, M., Harrold, M., & Carey, S. (2004). A survey of the level of 
intellectual disability (ID) among the prison population in Ireland. Journal of 
Intellectual Disability Research, 48, 463-463. 
Murphy, G. H., Harnett, H., & Holland, A. J. (1995). A survey of intellectual disabilities 
amongst men on remand in prison. Mental Handicap Research, 8, 81-98. 
Murphy, G. H. & Mason, J. (2007). People with intellectual disabilities who are at risk of 
offending. In N. Bouras & G. Holt (Eds.), Psychiatric and Behavioural Disorders 
in Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (pp. 173-201). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nelson, J. R., Smith, D. J., & Dodd, J. (1990). The moral reasoning of juvenile 
delinquents: a meta-analysis. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 18, 231-
239. 
Niles, W. (1986). Effects of a moral development discussion group on deliquent and 
predeliquent boys. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 33, 1986. 
O'Kane, A., Fawcett, A., & Blackburn, R. (1996). Psychopathy and moral reasoning: 
comparison of two classifications. Personality and Individual Differences, 20, 
505-514. 
Palmer, E. J. (2003a). Offending Behaviour: Moral Reasoning, Criminal Conduct and the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing. 
Moral Reasoning and Intellectual Disabilities 25 
Palmer, E. J. (2003b). An overview of the relationship between moral reasoning and 
offending. Australian Psychologist, 38, 165-174. 
Piaget, J. (1932). The Moral Judgement of the Child. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Ltd. 
Rest, J. (1979). Development in Judging Moral Issues. Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press  
Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Thoma, S. J., & Bebeau, M. J. (1999). DIT-2: Devising and testing 
a new instrument of moral judgement. Journal of Educational Psychology, 91(4), 
644-659. 
Schweder, R. (1982). Review of Lawrence Kohlberg's essays in moral development: The 
philosophy of moral development. Contemporary Psychology, 1, 421-424. 
Sigman, M., Ungerer, J. A., & Russell, A. (1983). Moral judgment in relation to 
behavioral and cognitive disorders in adolescents. Journal of Abnormal Child 
Psychology, 11, 503-511. 
Simpson, E. L. (1974). Moral development research. Human Development, 17, 81-106. 
Singleton, N., Meltzer, H., Gatward, R., Coid, J., & Deasy, D. (1997). Psychiatric 
Morbidity Among Prisoners: Summary Report. London: Office of National 
Statistics. 
6WDPV*-%UXJPDQ''HNRYLü0	YDQ5RVPDOHQ/7KHPRUDO
judgement of juvenile delinquents: A meta-analysis. Journal of Abnormal Child 
Psychology, 34, 697-713. 
Stevenson, S. F., Hall, G., & Innes, J. M. (2003). Sociomoral resoning and criminal 
sentiments in Australian men and women violent offenders and non-offenders. 
International Journal of Forensic Psychology, 1, 111-119. 
Sullivan, E. V. (1977). A study of Kohlberg's structural theory of moral development.  A 
critique of liberal social science ideology. Human Development, 20, 353-376. 
Taylor, J. J. & Achenbach, T. M. (1975). Moral and cognitive development in retarded 
and nonretarded children. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 80, 43-50. 
Thornton, D. & Reid, R. L. (1982). Moral reasoning and type of criminal offence. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 21, 231-238. 
Tomlinson-Keasey, C. & Keasey, C. B. (1974). The mediating role of cognitive 
development in moral judgement. Child Development, 45, 291-298. 
Trevethan, S. D. & Walker, L. J. (1989). Hypothetical versus real-life moral reasoning 
among psychopathic and delinquent youth. Development and Psychopathology, 1, 
91-103. 
Watt, M. C., Frausin, S., Dixon, J., & Nimmo, S. (2000). Moral intelligence in a sample 
of incarcerated females. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 27, 330-355. 
 
 
Moral Reasoning and Intellectual Disabilities 26 
Table 1: Kohlberg¶V (1969) Stages of Moral Development  
 
Level and Stage Description 
Level 1: Preconventional 
Stage 1: Heteronomous Morality Egocentric viewpoint. Moral decisions based mainly 
on the avoidance of physical punishment associated 
with failure to adhere to rules.  No consideration 
given to the interests or views of others.   
Stage 2: Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and 
Exchange 
Concrete individualistic viewpoint. Moral decisions 
based mainly upon rule adherence when such 
adherence is congruent with meeting own needs or 
interests. Recognition that others also have needs to 
fulfil.   
Level 2: Conventional  
Stage 3: Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, 
Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity 
 
Individual viewpoint within the context of 
relationships with others.  Moral decisions based 
upon recognition of the value of being a good 
person within the context of relationships.  
Recognition of the value of mutual relationships.  
Stage 4: Social System and Conscience A viewpoint based upon an awareness of the 
difference between societal views and individual 
views in relation to society.  Moral decisions based 
around societal laws and rules accompanied with 
recognition of their purpose (i.e. to allow for the 
continued functioning of societies).  Some laws may 
be broken if they conflict with agreed social norms 
governing behaviour within society.  
Level 3: Postconventional or Principled 




recognise that people have differing views which 
vary according to social group, but some higher 
order values are overarching and should not be 
violated (e.g. right to life).   Recognition of the 
social contract which exists regarding behaviour, 
and some utilitarian thinking.  
Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles A moral viewpoint.  Moral decisions are based upon 
well developed ethical arguments or principles 
which drive behaviour.  Laws may be broken if they 
violate these principles. Further recognition of 
concepts such as justice, human rights, and dignity.   
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Level and Stage Description 
Level 1: Immature 
Stage 1: Unilateral and Physicalistic 
 
Moral justifications are based upon unilateral 
authority and rule based, or related to punitive 
consequences of the violation of rules.    
Stage 2: Exchanging and Instrumental Moral justifications based upon an understanding 
that has arisen from social interaction with others.   
For example, decisions to help others may be 
justified because that person may help you in the 
future.  Justifications remain superficial. 
Level 2: Mature 
Stage 3: Mutual and Prosocial 
 
Moral justifications are characterised by further 
decentration, and are based upon a prosocial 
understanding of emotional states (e.g. empathy), 
care and good conduct.   
Stage 4: Systemic and Standard 
 
Further maturity is indexed by the development of 
an understanding of the complex social structures in 
which we live.  Justifications are also based upon 
constructs such as rights, values and character 
within society.  Other justifications may be based 
upon social justice and responsibility or conscience.    
 






























Figure 1: (a) An hypothesised moderating relationship for intelligence between moral reasoning and 
illegal behaviour such that the relationship between illegal behaviour and moral reasoning is linear 
(b) an hypothesised moderating relationship for intelligence between moral reasoning and illegal 
behaviour where the relationship between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour takes an inverted 
U-shape.  
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